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Proto-Aesthetics and the Theatrical Image
NICHOLAS PAIGE
This paper relates seventeenth-century antitheatrical discourse – the famous
“Querelle du théâtre” – both back and forward in time. Back, by considering
its relation to earlier debates on idolatry and iconoclasm; forward, by trying
to understand the place of the theater “quarrel” in the history of
Enlightenment aesthetic speculation. Another way of putting this would be
to say that my question is, “What’s new in the Quarrel?” For the attacks on
theatrical representation by thinkers such as Nicole are commonly taken to
be backward looking, both because they are redundant with respect to
intellectual history (they rehearse arguments made by Plato or Augustine)
and because their rigorism is founded on a doomed conception of the
secular (which must, the theater’s enemies have it, submit to religious
imperatives). My argument will stress, by contrast, the opposite articulation:
both pro- and antitheatrical forces share a conception of theater that is
symptomatic of aesthetic issues that will continue to play themselves out
until the end of the eighteenth century.
At first blush, seventeenth-century antitheatrical discourse begs to be
read as a variation on Renaissance Protestant iconophobia: just as Calvin
and other reformers proscribed visual representation of Christ, angels, and
saints, so do Nicole and Conti and Bossuet argue the anti-Christian nature of
theatrical spectacle. (This has been advanced by Marc Fumaroli, among
others.1) Brief reflection, however, reveals the shakiness of the analogy:
iconoclasts and iconophiles argued about the representation of divinity,
with iconoclasts holding that Christian religious images were no different
1 The suggestion is briefly made by Marc Fumaroli as a point of departure for his
“Sacerdos sive rhetor, orator sive histrio: rhétorique, théologie et ‘moralité du
théâtre’ en France de Corneille à Molière,” in Héros et orateurs: rhétorique et dra-
maturgie cornéliennes (Geneva: Droz, 1990), p. 449. See also the similar
contention in the appendix to Emmanuelle Hénin, Ut pictura theatrum: théâtre et
peinture, de la Renaissance italienne au classicisme français (Geneva: Droz, 2003),
pp. 619-31; I will take up Hénin’s reading presently.
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from pagan idols; but the two sides did not argue about representing the
secular or natural world, which is precisely the terrain of the seventeenth-
century Quarrel.2 This is not to say, however, that the Quarrel had nothing
to do with biblical injunctions against idolatry. Indeed, the word “idolatry”
occurs in some of the Quarrel’s main texts. The Prince de Conti, in his Traité
de la Comédie et des Spectacles (1666), speaking of the extraordinary
emotion caused by seeing actors in the flesh, thus asks, “n’est-ce pas un
terrible mal que cette idolâtrie que commet le Cœur humain dans une
violente passion?” The idea, here, is that theater is idolatry in the sense that
it erects man himself as a false god: “La créature y chasse Dieu du cœur de
l’homme, pour y dominer à sa place, y recevoir des sacrifices et des adora-
tions.”3 Nicole’s Traité de la Comédie (1667) echoes Conti, relating as it
does idolatry to seductive depictions of the language of love; and Nicole
levels charges against theater’s concern with questions of honor and
revenge, because “ce fantôme d’honneur qui est leur idole” sensitizes
spectators to slights they otherwise would have rightly ignored.4
Yet even if they mark something of a return to an old argument, these
uses of “idolatry” do not, in fact, look much like what one finds in the
writings of the Church fathers. (Scripture says next to nothing about
spectacle or theater, as even Tertullian had to acknowledge.) Indeed,
scholars such as Laurent Thirouin have pointed out that the Church fathers’
arguments weren’t of much use to French antitheatrical forces, because the
idolatry of pagan spectacle had been understood to derive from its link to
rituals dedicated to false gods – Jupiter, Bacchus, and so on.5 Moreover,
2 Christian iconoclasm did not proscribe secular art, only the cult of images;
moreover, because the natural world was de-divinitized by the Reform it became a
worthy subject of representation, which was understood to be a technical feat that
underlined the nobility of the artist. See Alain Besançon, L’image interdite: une
histoire intellectuelle de l’iconoclasme (Paris: Fayard, 1994), pp. 171 and 259.
3 Armand de Bourbon, Prince de Conti, Traité de la Comédie et des Spectacles, in
Pierre Nicole, Traité de la Comédie et autres pièces d’un procès du théâtre, ed.
Laurent Thirouin (Paris: Champion, 1998), p. 202.
4 Nicole, Traité de la Comédie, pp. 56 and 74. Similar references to idolatry can be
found in more minor texts of the Quarrel. For example, Gerbais writes in his Lettre
d’un docteur de Sorbonne (1694): “les intrigues d’amour qui en sont presque
inséparables ne laissent pas d’honorer cette Déesse [Venus]; et quoiqu’on ne les
accompagne pas d’encens, il est au moins sûr que ces intrigues ne sont pas des
offrandes qui puissent être présentées au véritable Dieu” (cited in Henry Phillips,
The Theatre and Its Critics in Seventeenth-Century France (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1980), p. 93).
5 Laurent Thirouin, L’aveuglement salutaire: le réquisitoire contre le théâtre dans la
France classique (Paris: Champion, 1997), p. 36.
Proto-Aesthetics and the Theatrical Image 519
pace Hénin and Fumaroli, Conti and Nicole never make the charge that
secular images are antithetical to Christianity. What we do see them doing
is taking the old reproach of idolatry and making it metaphorical, in some
sense psychologized: idolatry, here, lies not in the literal worship of a false
god, not in the adoration of empty images, but in allowing one’s passions to
usurp God’s importance in our hearts.
Such psychologizing of the theatrical experience – the concern with the
effect of theatrical spectacle on the observer – was of course everywhere in
France by the time Nicole and Conti were writing. That is, a set of shared
suppositions about the nature of theater, focused around the idea of
emotional contagion between characters, actors, and spectators, united Cor-
neille and Bossuet, Nicole and d’Aubignac.6 Interest in the effect of theater
on the passions was not new; in fact, it had a prestigious pedigree. Plato’s
reference, in the Ion (536a), to the emotional “chain” linking the god to the
poet to the actor to the spectator was known in France, and Plato mentions
elsewhere, albeit briefly, phenomena such as audience sympathy with
bereaved protagonists (Republic 605d). More important for the seventeenth-
century debate are Augustine’s acute dissection of theater’s emotional
effects in the Confessions (III, 2), and of course Aristotle’s cryptic remarks
on catharsis in the Poetics. The most important ancient touchstones, how-
ever, didn’t concern the theater per se, but rather rhetorical theory:
passages from Cicero and Quintilian were routinely adduced, along with
two lines from Horace’s Art of Poetry: “If you desire to hear me weep, you
must truly grieve” (lines 101-03). Emmanuelle Hénin, in her imposing thesis
Ut pictura theatrum, has performed a seemingly complete exhumation of
the idea of mimetic emotional contagion in the Italian Renaissance;
Horace’s lines figure prominently there. At any rate, in seventeenth-century
France the contagion model was commonplace. I’ll limit myself to citing one
6 I am certainly not the first to point out the fact that enemies and proponents
subscribed to the same basic assumptions. See, e.g., John Lyons, Kingdom of
Disorder: The Theory of Tragedy in Classical France (West Lafayette (IN): Purdue
University Press, 1999), pp. 74 and 78; Georges Forestier, Passions tragiques et
règles classiques: essai sur la tragédie française (Paris: PUF, 2003), p. 78; and
Louis Marin, “La critique de la représentation théâtrale classique à Port-Royal:
commentaires sur le Traité de la Comédie de Nicole,” Continuum 2: Rethinking
Classicism, ed. David Lee Rubin, vol. 2 (New York: AMS Press, 1990), p. 90. It is
because of this rich current of thought, which they merely inverted, that French
antitheatricalists could go so much further than their English counterparts, who,
as one historian of the Quarrel has noted, could only complain of the dissolute
mores of actors; see Jonas Barish, The Antitheatrical Prejudice (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1981), pp. 194-96.
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full-blown example, where there is complete fusion between poet, character,
actor, and spectator. (This is from La Mesnardière’s Poétique, of 1639,
which puts it near the beginning of this argument’s penetration into French
theatrical discourse.)
Le Poète se figure [les passions] avec tant de réalité durant la composition
qu’il ressent la Jalousie, la Haine, la Vengeance, avec toutes leurs émotions,
tandis qu’il en fait le tableau [...]. Ensuite l’excellent Acteur épouse tous les
sentiments qu’il trouve dans cet ouvrage et se les met dans l’esprit avec tant
de véhémence que l’on en a vu quelques-uns si vivement touchés des choses
qu’ils exprimaient qu’il leur était impossible de ne se pas fondre en larmes
[...] après avoir représenté des aventures pitoyables. Enfin l’Auditeur […]
entre dans tous les sentiments de la Personne théâtrale [i.e., the actor] ; il
est gai lorsqu’elle est contente; si elle gémit, il soupire; […] bref il suit tous
ces mouvements, et il ressent que son cœur est comme un champ de
bataille où la science du Poète fait combattre quand il lui plaît mille
Passions tumultueuses.7
One could probably expand the context for the contagion model – for
instance, it’s consonant with medical explanations of sympathy that extend
back, again, to the Greeks, and that are still easily detectible in Male-
branche, for whom we feel the pain of others literally, in our own bodies.8
Lacking space to pursue such threads, I will simply add that Nicole’s Traité
de la Comédie, where the word “contagion” occurs a number of times, is
largely built on this conception.
To return to idolatry specifically, when the word occurred in anti-
theatrical texts, in its metaphorical usage, it did so only sparsely. Emma-
nuelle Hénin, in the appendix to her book, has attempted to frame the
entire seventeenth-century antitheatrical movement as part of a millennial
reflection on idols; to do so, however, she needs to equate idolatry with the
making of any image.9 Yet the Bible does not assimilate idolatry to the
7 Jules Pilet de La Mesnardière, La poétique (Paris: Antoine de Sommaville, 1639),
pp. 73-74.
8 See Pierre Force, Self-Interest before Adam Smith: A Genealogy of Economic
Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 29. Sympathy was in
no way a special case, since general discourse on the passions was largely somatic
as well; see Lucie Desjardins, Le corps parlant: savoirs et représentations des
passions au XVIIe siècle ([Sainte-Foy, Québec]: Presses de l’Université Laval,
2001).
9 Hénin’s interpretation of the Quarrel as an episode in the Judeo-Christian war on
idolatry derives from her reading of the apocryphal Book of Wisdom 13-15, in
which she sees evidence that the image, “frappée d’un néant ontologique,” “offre
le prototype d’une création humaine voulant singer Dieu” (Hénin, Ut pictura
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making of secular images.10 And what the Church later concerned itself with
was distinguishing the licit Christian use of religious images – icons – from
those pagan idols whose condemnation was so central to Judaism. In the
Hebrew Bible, idolatry involved the worship of false gods, certainly; more
important, it designated a form of naïve belief, according to which the
image is the deity. Historically speaking, it is unclear to what extent this
was a fallacy invented with the express purpose of making Judaism’s com-
petitors look primitive, but at any rate, the Israelites held Yahweh to be
unrepresentable in physical form. Although Christianity likewise asserted
the absolute transcendence of God, a more permissive relation to images
was more or less necessitated by the Incarnation: Christ was held to be God
made man, the image of God – “Whoever has seen me has seen the Father”
(John 14:9) – and in view of this, it was difficult to assimilate images and
emptiness. The Council of Trent offered the following view of the religious
image, which became the Church line: the image is venerated not because it
is divine or partakes of the divine, but because the honor paid it is reflected
back to the model.11 If the idol binds image and referent, the icon divorces
them.
Using this type of terminology – and our use can only be heuristic – we
can say this about most theories of the theater from the 1630s on: theater is
a kind of temporary idolatry, in the sense that viewers take the image for its
referent. The poet, the actor, the spectator all “know” that the play is not
the thing; but contagious passion makes us forget, makes idolaters out of us.
Indeed, the efficacy of the theater depends on our idolatrous relation to it.
In this, we would appear to be close to Port-Royal’s conception of the sign,
theatrum, p. 619). Yet Wisdom, and the Judeo-Christian tradition generally,
separate the making of images from their worship: it is only with the latter that
the critique of idolatry concerns itself. One might note that Hegel’s dismissal of
the ideal of the imitation of nature partially on the grounds of it being sacrilegious
(he actually says “presumptuous”) needs to be made through the invocation of
Islamic, not Christian, beliefs; see G. W. F. Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art,
trans. T. M. Knox, 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), vol. 1, p. 42.
10 This leads one historian of the Quarrel to conclude that compared to earlier
attacks, “l’accusation d’idolâtrie est moins fréquente pour des raisons évidentes”
(Sylviane Léoni, Le Poison et le remède: théâtre, morale et rhétorique en France et
en Italie, 1694-1758 (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1998), p. 53). The best
antitheatrical forces can come up with is to incriminate the theater as a kind of
disguise, a “painted woman”: the vocabulary of the fard recurs continually in the
Quarrel. See Hénin, Ut pictura theatrum, pp. 620-22.
11 See Besançon, L’image interdite. For an alternate take, see Bruno Latour, “How to
Be Iconophilic in Art, Science, and Religion?,” in Picturing Science, Producing Art,
ed. Caroline A. Jones and Peter Galison (New York: Routledge, 1998), pp. 418-40.
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at least as Louis Marin has understood it – arbitrary yet transparent, an icon
taken for an idol. Indeed, as Marin recalls in his discussion of Nicole’s Traité
de la Comédie, Nicole shares with many seventeenth-century theoreticians
the idea of the theater as optical illusion: not only do poets and actors and
spectators all partake of the same emotion, spectators do so because they
react to the visual spectacle as if before reality. Other theories were
possible – for instance, some envisioned enargeia being transmitted from
the imagination of the artist to that of the spectator – but as Georges
Forestier has argued, theater as “mimetic illusion” is very much a constant,
from Chapelain’s Lettre sur la règle des vingt-quatre heures (1630) to
d’Aubignac’s Pratique du théâtre (1657).12 (And Hénin’s work demonstrates
that French theoreticians were doing nothing new, here.) Seventeenth-
century French theater was a willfully induced state of idolatry, pure and
simple. D’Aubignac: “Le théâtre n’est autre chose qu’une représentation, il
ne se faut point imaginer qu’il y ait rien de tout ce que nous y voyons, mais
bien les choses mêmes dont nous y trouvons les images.”13
Well, not so pure and simple, of course: problems with the model were
recognized repeatedly. For instance, there was the material problem
Christian Biet has written of: given theatrical conditions of the time (not the
least of which were those pesky fops sitting on the stage), was the illusion
that Chapelain and d’Aubignac described even remotely possible?14 But
above and beyond this, there was a persistent nagging feeling that this
argument, and this account of theatrical pleasure, left something to be
desired. The contagion model necessitated spectators feeling exactly the
same emotion that the actors felt that in turn the poet felt when copying
what his model felt. It couldn’t explain what we might want to call aesthetic
emotions – that is emotions that were different from the emotions repre-
sented (pleasure, for starters). There were plenty of ancient touchstones,
here, from Aristotle’s observation that we view with pleasure exact copies of
cadavers and hideous beasts (Poetics IV) to the Lucretian suavity with
which the onlooker watches boats battling the waves. Hénin shows that a
select few Italians used these topoi as a springboard for thinking about what
12 Forestier, Passions tragiques, 73-117. Forestier demonstrates that this illusionism
is in fact perfectly compatible, in Chapelain’s thinking, with the demands of
vraisemblance. See also on this subject Timothy J. Reiss, Toward Dramatic
Illusion: Theatrical Technique and Meaning from Hardy to Horace (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1971), not cited by Forestier or Hénin.
13 François Hédelin d’Aubignac, La pratique du théâtre (Amsterdam: Jean-Frédéric
Bernard, 1715), pp. 87-88.
14 Christian Biet, “L’avenir des illusions, ou le théâtre de l’illusion perdue,”
Littératures Classiques 44 (2002), pp. 175-214.
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she calls “the autonomy of aesthetic pleasure”; but while the paradox was
remarked, it certainly did not cause the edifice of contagion to crumble, as I
hope to show now.15
Faced with this paradox, seventeenth-century thinkers reacted in a
number of ways. Nicole’s Jansenism furnished a perfect solution – we take
pleasure seeing pain because of our secret love of vice – but this was
atypical.16 A more prominent line of thinking sprang from Aristotle’s remark
on paintings of cadavers: the pleasure one feels comes from wonder at the
artist’s handiwork, explain Boileau and Lamy.17 But this argument was
limited to discussions of “low” art – that is, still life, which manifestly could
not please through conformity between subject matter and audience
emotion. Moreover, it was altogether better, La Mesnardière wrote, not to
pursue such “bizarre” pleasures, which wasted artistic talent on Pascal’s
famous “choses dont on n’admire point les originaux.”18 On the other
extreme of the generic spectrum, where the imitation of human action was
concerned, the problem was dealt with in a similar way, that is, by getting
rid of the offending situation altogether: certain horrible acts on stage
would so shock the audience that they must be proscribed. Thus, through
the denigration of still life on the one hand and the bienséances on the
other, theorists carved out a middle ground of intense, but not too intense
emotions. Racine’s tears are the perfect solution to the problem: they are the
terrain on which the contagion model seems to work best.19 Cry with
Bérénice, and don’t think too hard about why you don’t go mad with
Oreste. A final option, I’d note, was to use catharsis in an aesthetic, and not
15 Hénin, Ut pictura theatrum, p. 494; see also for example p. 599: “l’analyse de Beni
s’avère (comme toujours) décevante: tout en critiquant la conception tradition-
nelle de l’empathie, il ne dépasse pas l’intuition du paradoxe, et ne précise pas les
modalités de cette émotion fictivement éprouvée par le poète.”
16 Nicole, Traité de la Comédie, p. 60; Bernard Lamy, in his Nouvelles réflexions sur
l’art poétique (1668), gives a similar explanation; see Hénin, Ut pictura theatrum,
p. 628 n. 34.
17 “Il n’est point de serpent ni de monstre odieux, // Qui, par l’art imité, ne puisse
plaire aux yeux: // D’un pinceau délicat l’artifice agréable // Du plus affreux objet
fait un objet aimable” (Boileau, Art poétique III, lines 1-4); “Ce qui plaît n’est pas
la vue d’un serpent qui est peint; … mais ce qui fait plaisir c’est l’esprit du peintre
qui a su atteindre la fin de son art” (Bernard Lamy, La rhétorique ou l’art de
parler, ed. Christine Noille-Clauzade (Paris: Champion, 1998), p. 114).
18 See Hénin, Ut pictura theatrum, pp. 499-500.
19 On tears in Racine, see especially Christian Biet, “La passion des larmes,” in
Littératures Classiques 26 (1996), pp. 167-83. From a different perspective, see
Pierre Giuliani, “D’un XVIIe siècle à l’autre: la question du sang sur scène,” in
Revue d’histoire littéraire de la France 104.2 (2004), pp. 305-23.
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moral, manner: somehow purgation might be understood to convert terror
and pity into pleasure. Alas, this line, taken up occasionally in the Italian
Renaissance, was not pursued by French thinkers.20
All of these ideas can be seen as veiled admissions – je sais bien mais
quand même – of the fact that the theater is not, after all, an idol. To
rephrase the title of the wonderful book by Paul Veyne on Greek attitudes
toward mythology, the French did not believe in their theatrical gods after
all. But they pretended they did. They had to: they could not think outside
the box, which in this case was la scène à l’italienne. How would the
inadequacy of the contagion paradigm be resolved? For the eighteenth
century, it won’t be, but all the major theorists confront the problem with
more tenacity than their earlier counterparts. From Du Bos to Diderot to
Burke to Batteux to Marmontel, there are different theories. Some hypo-
thesize a type of flickering, in-and-out identification; this is still evident in
Stendhal’s preference for Shakespeare over Racine, on the basis that his
drama contains more of those moments in which you are completely swept
up by the illusion. But they are just fleeting moments of idolatry, now, no
more. Another major idea – found in Du Bos and Burke – is to hold that
because we know that the theatrical image is an illusion, the passions the
audience feels are of necessity diminished copies of real ones.21 There is no
more total illusion, and this has the advantage of explaining why we don’t
go mad with Oreste: the effects of the copy are temporary, and they are
tempered. In his 1719 Réflexions critiques, Du Bos calls this “un plaisir
pur.”22 Presumably, this would be aesthetic pleasure. But there is still a
sleight of hand, here, because all his reasoning really does is allow for
reduced copies of real emotions – not for a qualitatively different type of
emotion.23 (Burke will attempt to distinguish delight from terror; but he too
runs into problems resulting from the fact that art is still seen to provide a
20 Hénin, Ut pictura theatrum, pp. 494-99. Hénin’s reading of Boileau’s “Il n’est point
de serpent” as a recognition of catharsis’s aesthetic dimension seems to me
debatable, however, since a better context is probably attention to the problems
posed by low subject matter in the still life.
21 “La copie de l’objet doit, pour ainsi dire, exciter en nous une copie de la passion
que l’objet y aurait excité. Mais [...] comme l’impression faite par l’imitation n’est
pas sérieuse, d’autant qu’elle ne va point jusqu’à la raison, pour laquelle il n’y a
point d’illusion dans ces sensations, [...] elle s’efface bientôt” (Jean-Baptiste Du
Bos, Réflexions critiques sur la poésie et sur la peinture (Geneva: Slatkine, 1967),
pp. 27-28).
22 Du Bos, Réflexions critiques, p. 29.
23 For a similar reading of Du Bos’s sleight of hand, see Peter Kivy, Osmin’s Rage:
Philosophical Reflections on Opera, Drama, and Text (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1988), p. 129.
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partial illusion of reality.) Eventually, only Kant and Hegel will get rid of
the difficulty by divorcing aesthetics from its etymological roots as a science
of perception.
It makes a certain sense for David Marshall, in his recent book The
Frame of Art, to note that unlike nineteenth-century aesthetics, founded on
the idea of disinterestedness, eighteenth-century versions are obsessed with
the “blurring of the boundaries between the realm of art and whatever is
defined in opposition to art: nature, reality, real life.”24 But he jumps to two
erroneous conclusions. First, that this blurring was an eighteenth-century
phenomenon: that century did bring its own pseudo-solutions to the
problem, and with all the urgency of a period founded on sensibilité; but
the blurring itself was old hat, even a hundred years earlier, when Nicole
and Conti incorporated it into their critique of the theater. Second, and
following from this: what is significant is not the blurring, but precisely the
repeated attempts to confront the paradoxes resulting from what I call the
contagion paradigm. What does strike me as right about Marshall’s point
(though I’m not sure he has this in mind) is that we must not conclude from
these attempts that Boileau and Du Bos “anticipate” Kant or Hegel, for it is
quite possible that the latter philosophers so rewrite the assumptions of
discourses on the arts as to make early aesthetic speculation qualitatively
different from what we might want to call “modern aesthetics.” The richest
reflections coming out of France on theatrical passions, and which have
accompanied my own work – Hénin’s Ut pictura theatrum and Forestier’s
Passions tragiques et règles classiques – may well be liable to this critique:
that is, they don’t adequately distinguish between what my title names as
“proto-aesthetics” and “aesthetics proper.” For this is ultimately the big
question: do all these attempts at understanding audience emotion prepare
the ground for the modern aesthetic regime, or are they false starts, as
Hegel had it, mooted by later developments? In spite of all the work that
has been done on eighteenth-century aesthetics, this seems to me to be the
key question, and one whose answer very much depends on taking into
consideration earlier theatrical idolatries.
24 David Marshall, The Frame of Art: Fictions of Aesthetic Experience, 1750-1815
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), p. 4.
